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Quasimarket failure

Author

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  • Peter Boettke
  • Christopher Coyne
  • Peter Leeson

Abstract

The efficiency of “quasimarkets”—decentralized public goods provision subjected to Tiebout competition—is a staple of public choice conventional wisdom. Yet in the 1990s a countermovement in political economy called “neoconsolidationism” began to challenge this wisdom. The neoconsolidationists use the logic of government failure central to public choice economics to argue that quasimarkets fail and that jurisdictional consolidation is a superior way to supply public goods and services in metropolitan areas. Public choice scholars have largely ignored the neoconsolidationists’ challenge. This paper brings that challenge to public choice scholars’ attention with the hope of encouraging responses. It also offers some preliminary thoughts about the directions such responses might take.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson, 2011. "Quasimarket failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 209-224, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:149:y:2011:i:1:p:209-224
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9833-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quasimarkets; Polycentric; Consolidation; Tiebout; Neoconsolidationism; Metropolitan; Governance; Public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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