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Citations for " Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor"

by Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans," Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  2. Elena Carletti & Vittoria Cerasi & Sonja Daltung, 2004. "Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/18, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li & Joanne Roberts, 2001. "Why do Governments Privatize," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 429, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Davide Iacoboni & Alberto Zazzaro, 2000. "Legal system efficiency, information production, and technological choice: a banking model," Heterogeneity and monetary policy 0005, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Graff, Richard A. & Kairys, Jr. Joseph P., 2005. "Property Rights, Risk and Leverage," Working Papers in Economics 183, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication : A Cross-Country Analysis," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2008-08, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
  7. Cresenta Fernando & Atreya Chakraborty & Rajiv Mallick, 2002. "The Importance of Being Known: Relationship Banking and Credit Limits," Finance 0209007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Christophe J. Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2007. "Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2007-03, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Heather M. Hulburt & Frederick C. Scherr, 2003. "Determinants of the collateralization of credit by small firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(6-7), pages 483-501. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1999. "Limited commitment and central bank lending," Working Paper 99-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Stanley D. Longhofer & João A.C. Santos, 1998. "The importance of bank seniority for relationship lending," Working Paper 9808, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Maria-Teresa Marchica, . "Debt Maturity and the Characteristics of Ownership Structure: An Empirical Investigation of UK Firms," Discussion Papers 05/29, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  14. Christa Hainz & Stefanie Kleimeier, 2004. "Political Risk in Syndicated Lending:Theory and Empirical Evidence Regarding the Use of ProjectFinance," Departmental Working Papers 197, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
  15. Lukas Menkhoff & Doris Neuberger & Chodechai Suwanaporn, 2005. "Collateral-Based Lending in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Thailand," Finance 0501008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2006. "A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral," CEPR Discussion Papers 5695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Paper 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kleimeier,Stefanie & William L. Megginson, 2002. "An empirical analysis of limited recourse project," Research Memoranda 066, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  19. Adriana Breccia, 2004. "Formal Bankruptcy: Strategic Debt Service with Senior and Junior Creditors," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0411, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Andrew Winton, 1996. "Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice," Working Paper 9616, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  22. Howard Bodenhorn, 2001. "Short-Term Loans and Long-Term Relationships: Relationship Lending in Early America," NBER Historical Working Papers 0137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. John, Kose & Lynch, Anthony W. & Puri, Manju, 2002. "Credit Ratings, Collateral and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield," Research Papers 1748, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  24. Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2004. "The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04021, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Christa Hainz & Stefanie Kleimeier, 2006. "Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending," Discussion Papers 183, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  26. Timo Baas & Mechthild Schrooten, 2005. "Relationship Banking and SMEs : A Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 469, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Andrew Winton, 1999. "Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification and Specialization in Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-16, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  28. Karel Janda, 2006. "Optimal Deterministic Debt Contracts," Working Papers IES 2006/25, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  29. Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2000. "Collateral, Default Risk, and Relationship Lending: An Empirical Study on Financial Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1998. "Beneficial "firm runs"," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 21-29. [Downloadable!]
  32. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2008-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-26.

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