Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending
AbstractWe develop a double moral hazard model that predicts that the use of project finance increases with both the political risk of the country in which the project is located and the influence of the lender over this political risk exposure. In contrast, the use of project finance should decrease as the economic health and corporate governance provisions of the borrowerâ€™s home country improve. When we test these predictions with a global sample of syndicated loans to borrowers in 139 countries, we find overall support for our model and provide evidence that multilateral development banks act as â€œpolitical umbrellasâ€.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 183.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
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More information through EDIRC
project finance; syndicated loans; political risk; double moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-01-14 (Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2007-01-14 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-PPM-2007-01-14 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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