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What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?

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Author Info
Christophe J. Godlewski () (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur)

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Abstract

We investigate the influence of loan and syndicate characteristics and information disclosure and legal environment factors on the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndications (measured as the time elapsed from the launching until the completion of the deal) from 68 countries over the 1992-2006 period. Employing accelerated failure time models from survival analysis methodology, we find that loan, syndicate, legal environment and information disclosure characteristics which reduce agency problems related to syndication reduce the arrangement timetable. Among the country level characteristics, information disclosure which reduces moral hazard due to informational frictions between syndicate members appears to be the most important driver of a faster deal arrangement timetable, while better creditor rights protection increase the arrangement timetable, consistently with recontracting risk issues.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg (France) in its series Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) with number 2008-02.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2008-02

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Related research
Keywords: Syndicated loans arrangement timetable Agency problems Information disclosure Legal risk Survival analysis Accelerated failure time models.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  2. Schure, Paul & Scoones, David & Gu, Qinghua, 2005. "A theory of loan syndication," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 165-172, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  14. Pegaret Pichler & William Wilhelm, 2001. "A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe05, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
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