Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pegaret Pichler
  • William Wilhelm

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds. Reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect. We derive conditions under which restricted entry and designation of a lead banker strictly Pareto dominate, in which case it is also strictly Pareto dominant for the syndicate's fee to be greater than members' cost of participation.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk/file_links/finecon_papers/2001fe05.pdf
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Maxine Collett)
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Oxford Financial Research Centre in its series OFRC Working Papers Series with number 2001fe05.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2001fe05

    Contact details of provider:
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Lakicevic, Milan & Shachmurove, Yochanan & Vulanovic, Milos, 2013. "Institutional changes of SPACs," MPRA Paper 44181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
    3. Jian Cai, 2009. "Competition or collaboration? The reciprocity effect in loan syndication," Working Paper 0909, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Christophe Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2008. "Syndicated loans in emerging markets," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/14182, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Shivdasani, Anil & Song, Wei-Ling, 2011. "Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate structure, and underwriting incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 581-600, March.
    6. Tykvová, Tereza, 2005. "Who Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-74, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    7. Vinicius Carrasco & Gustavo Manso, 2006. "Syndication and Robust Collusion in Financial Markets," Textos para discussão 522, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    8. Marie-Hélène Broihanne & Christophe Godlewski, 2014. "Building reputation on the syndicated lending market: A participant bank perspective," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2014-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    9. Shivdasani, Anil & Song, Wei-Ling, 2010. "Breaking Down the Barriers: Competition, Syndicate Structure, and Underwriting Incentives," Working Papers 10-25, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    10. Christophe Godlewski, 2009. "L’organisation des syndicats bancaires en France:taille, concentration et réputation," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 37-63, September.
    11. Bouaiss, Karima & Refait-Alexandre, Catherine & Alexandre, Hervé, 2011. "Banking relationship and syndicated loans during the last financial crisis," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8559, Paris Dauphine University.
    12. Wang, Lanfang & Wang, Susheng, 2012. "Endogenous networks in investment syndication," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 640-663.
    13. Hoje Jo & Yongtae Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2012. "Underwriter syndication and corporate governance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 61-86, January.
    14. Jeon, Jin Q. & Ligon, James A., 2011. "The role of co-managers in reducing flotation costs: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1041-1056, May.
    15. McCahery, Joseph & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2010. "Bank reputation in the private debt market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 498-515, September.
    16. Lee, Sang Whi & Kwag, Seung-Woog (Austin) & Mullineaux, Donald J. & Park, Kwangwoo, 2010. "Financial distress, information asymmetry, and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 119-126, June.
    17. Karima Bouaiss & Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2009. "La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels - Une analyse empirique sur le marché français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(2), pages 35-68, June.
    18. Tykvová, Tereza & Schertler, Andrea, 2011. "Cross-border venture capital flows and local ties: Evidence from developed countries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 36-48, February.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2001fe05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maxine Collett).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.