Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The strategic behavior of banks during a financial crisis; evidence from the syndicated loan market

Contents:

Author Info

  • de Haas, Ralph
  • van Horen, Neeltje

Abstract

We examine the strategic reaction of banks to the current global financial crisis. In particular, we test whether banks predominantly react by diversifying their loan portfolio or by stepping up their screening and monitoring. To this end we analyze information on nearly 17,000 syndicated loans that were granted to private borrowers in 60 countries over the period 2005-2008. We exploit the variation in lender and borrower characteristics to examine whether banks’ risk-mitigating strategies differ across borrower types. Our results show that during a financial crisis arranging banks retain larger portions of loans and form more concentrated syndicates, reflecting an increased need to screen and monitor borrowers. During a crisis, agency problems are attenuated in syndicates that lend to repeat borrowers and that are composed by experienced arrangers.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14164/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14657/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15015/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16382/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17981/
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14164.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14164

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: bank lending; financial crisis; asymmetric information; syndication;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, 04.
  2. Iftekhar Hasan & Anthony Saunders & Viral V. Acharya, 2002. "Should banks be diversified? Evidence from individual bank loan portfolios," BIS Working Papers 118, Bank for International Settlements.
  3. Chowdhry, Bhagwan, 1991. "What Is Different about International Lending?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 121-48.
  4. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2008-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  5. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2003. "The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behaviour," BIS Working Papers 125, Bank for International Settlements.
  6. Broecker, Thorsten, 1990. "Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 429-52, March.
  7. Ralph De Haas & Iman Van Lelyveld, 2008. "Internal capital markets and lending by multinational bank subsidiaries," Working Papers 105, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  8. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 367-384, 03.
  9. Allen, Franklin, 1990. "The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-30, March.
  10. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
  11. Jonathan D. Jones & William W. Lang & Peter J. Nigro, 2005. "Agent Bank Behavior In Bank Loan Syndications," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(3), pages 385-402.
  12. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Gupta, Poonam, 2000. "Inside the crisis : an empirical analysis of banking systems in distress," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2431, The World Bank.
  13. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  14. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441, May.
  15. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
  16. Katerina Simons, 1993. "Why do banks syndicate loans?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 45-52.
  17. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
  18. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September.
  19. Dennis, Steven A. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2000. "Syndicated Loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 404-426, October.
  20. Steven Ongena, 1999. "Lending Relationships, Bank Default and Economic Activity," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 257-280.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Marcello Pagnini & Silvia Del Prete & Paola Rossi & Valerio Vacca, 2013. "Lending Organization and Credit Supply During the Crisis," ERSA conference papers ersa13p673, European Regional Science Association.
  2. Berg, Gunhild & Kirschenmann, Karolin, 2012. "Funding vs. real economy shock : the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on small firms'credit availability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6030, The World Bank.
  3. Ralph De Haas & Neeltje Van Horen, 2011. "Running for the exit: international banks and crisis transmission," Working Papers 124, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  4. Christophe Godlewski, 2012. "Are bank loans still “special” (especially during a crisis)? Empirical evidence from a European country," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2012-03, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  5. Blaise Gadanecz & Alper Kara & Philip Molyneux, 2011. "The value of repeat lending," BIS Working Papers 350, Bank for International Settlements.
  6. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2014. "Bank loans and borrower value during the global financial crisis: Empirical evidence from France," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 100-130.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.