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Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

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Author Info
AMIR SUFI
Abstract

I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01219.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 62 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 629-668
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:62:y:2007:i:2:p:629-668

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  1. Ongena, Steven & Tümer-Alkan, Günseli & Westernhagen, Natalja von, 2007. "Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2007,15, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Tschirhart & James O'Brien & Michael Moise & Emily Yang, 2007. "Bank commercial loan fair value practices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-29, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2009. "Unstable Banking," NBER Working Papers 14943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Evan Gatev & Philip Strahan, 2008. "Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure," NBER Working Papers 13802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication : A Cross-Country Analysis," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2008-08, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
  6. Godlewski, Christophe, 2008. "Duration of loan arrangement and syndicate organization," MPRA Paper 10953, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. de Haas, Ralph & van Horen, Neeltje, 2009. "The crisis as a wake-up call. Do banks tighten screening and monitoring standards during a financial crisis?," MPRA Paper 14164, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Yener Altunbaş & Alper Kara & David Marqués-Ibáñez, 2009. "Large debt financing: syndicated loans versus corporate bonds," Working Paper Series 1028, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Antonio Guarino & Steffen Huck & Heike Harmgart, 2008. "When half the truth is better than the truth: A Theory of aggregate information cascades," WEF Working Papers 0046, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
  10. Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, 2009. "Universal Banks and Corporate Control - Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market," Working Paper Series 1066, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jian Cai, 2009. "Competition or collaboration? The reciprocity effect in loan syndication," Working Paper 0909, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  12. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2008-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
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