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Lender Exposure and Effort in the Syndicated Loan Market

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  • Nada Mora

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> This article tests for asymmetric information problems between the lead arranger and the participants in a lending syndicate. One problem comes from adverse selection, whereby the lead has a private informational advantage over participants. A second problem comes from moral hazard, whereby the lead puts less effort in monitoring when it retains a smaller loan share. Applying an instrumental variables strategy using lending limits, borrower performance is improved by increasing the lead's share. The focus is on separating moral hazard from adverse selection and the results are consistently indicative of monitoring. First, the lead's share is more important for revocable credit lines than for fully funded term facilities. Second, a lead with greater liquidity risk reduces its share resulting in worse borrower performance, but its liquidity risk does not affect the quality of credits it chooses to syndicate in the first place. Third, covenants are paired with a higher lead share, and the sensitivity between share and borrower ex post performance is greater on loans with more covenants.

Suggested Citation

  • Nada Mora, 2015. "Lender Exposure and Effort in the Syndicated Loan Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(1), pages 205-252, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:82:y:2015:i:1:p:205-252
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    3. Parlour, Christine A. & Winton, Andrew, 2013. "Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 25-45.
    4. Galina Hale & Tümer Kapan & Camelia Minoiu & Philip Strahan, 2020. "Shock Transmission Through Cross-Border Bank Lending: Credit and Real Effects," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(10), pages 4839-4882.
    5. Cerasi, Vittoria & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2014. "Rethinking the regulatory treatment of securitization," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 20-31.
    6. Isin, Adnan Anil, 2018. "Tax avoidance and cost of debt: The case for loan-specific risk mitigation and public debt financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 344-378.
    7. Dorobantu, Sinziana & Müllner, Jakob, 2019. "Debt-side governance and the geography of project finance syndicates," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-179.
    8. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Barth, Andreas, 2017. "Syndicated loans and CDS positioning," ESRB Working Paper Series 58, European Systemic Risk Board.

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