Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit
AbstractBank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.
Volume (Year): 56 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566
Syndicated loans Secondary loan market Originate-to-distribute Moral hazard Adverse selection;
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