Capital Structure and Debt Structure
AbstractUsing a novel data set that records individual debt issues on the balance sheet of a large random sample of rated public firms, we show that a recognition of debt heterogeneity leads to new insights into the determinants of corporate capital structure. We first demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss a substantial fraction of capital structure variation. We then show that relative to high credit quality firms, low credit quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. Further, while high credit quality firms enjoy access to a variety of sources of discretionary flexible sources of finance, low credit quality firms rely on tightly monitored secured bank debt for liquidity. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to preserve manager and creditor incentives.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14488.
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2008-11-18 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-11-18 (Business Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Erel, Isil & Julio, Brandon & Kim, Woojin & Weisbach, Michael S., 2011.
"Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Raising,"
Working Paper Series
2011-9, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Isil Erel & Brandon Julio & Woojin Kim & Michael S. Weisbach, 2011. "Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Raising," NBER Working Papers 16941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Erel, Isil & Julio, Brandon & Kim, Woojin & Weisbach, Michael S., 2010. "Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Raising," SIFR Research Report Series 74, Institute for Financial Research, revised 26 Oct 2011.
- Tucker, Jon & Stoja, Evarist, 2011. "Industry membership and capital structure dynamics in the UK," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 207-214, August.
- Choi, Jaewon & Hackbarth, Dirk & Zechner, Josef, 2013. "Granularity of corporate debt," CFS Working Paper Series 2013/26, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Mahmoudi, Babak & Mohammadi, Ali, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts," MPRA Paper 49780, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gropp, Reint & Hirsch, Christian & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2011. "Is rated debt arm's length? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/10, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.