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Supply of credit and corporate bond covenants

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  • Akdoğu, Evrim
  • Alp Paukowits, Aysun

Abstract

We study whether shocks to the supply of capital affect bond covenant structures using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. and the subsequent regulatory changes as an exogenous contraction in the supply of speculative-grade credit around 1989. We find that speculative-grade firms increase their covenant use significantly more than the investment-grade firms in the post-1989 period. This result is robust to using alternative control groups such as using only the BBB-rated firms, unrated firms, and employing matched sample analysis. Consistent with a supply effect, the increase in covenant use is higher for firms with high costs of switching to alternative sources of funds and high dependence on external finance. Overall, our results suggest that shifts in credit supply affect not only the debt amounts but also the bond covenant structures. Even contracting terms of firms with access to public debt markets are not immune to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Akdoğu, Evrim & Alp Paukowits, Aysun, 2022. "Supply of credit and corporate bond covenants," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:72:y:2022:i:c:s0929119921002790
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102157
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bond covenants; Credit supply; Speculative-grade bonds; Financial constraints; Drexel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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