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Special-Interest Groups and Growth

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  • Bonnie Wilson

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Saint Louis University)

  • Dennis Coates

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore County)

  • Jac Heckelman

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University)

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and economic growth, using newly assembled data on the number of groups observed across countries. In a sample of 86 countries at two points in time (for a total of 169 observations), we ¯nd support for Mancur Olson's theory that interest group activity reduces economic growth. We also ¯nd evidence that interest groups are negatively associated with both channels to growth - capital stock growth and productivity growth.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Saint Louis University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007-01.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation:
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Publication status: Published in Public Choice, 2011, pages 439-457
Handle: RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-01

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Keywords: growth; institutional sclerosis; special-interest groups;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Eiji Yamamura & Haruo Kondoh, 2012. "Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: The case of Japan for 1998–2004," EERI Research Paper Series, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels EERI_RP_2012_13, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
  2. Neyapti, Bilin, 2013. "Modeling institutional evolution," Economic Systems, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-16.
  3. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.
  4. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.

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