IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/slu/wpaper/2007-03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Determinants of Interest Group Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Bonnie Wilson

    (Department of Economics, Saint Louis University)

  • Dennis Coates

    (Department of Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore County)

  • Jac Heckelman

    (Department of Economics, Wake Forest University)

Abstract

It is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation’s stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation, as predicted by theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman, 2007. "Determinants of Interest Group Formation," Working Papers 2007-03, Saint Louis University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.slu-econ-wp.com/RePEc/slu/bonnie_wilson/formation.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2007
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.
    2. William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison & Zhipeng Yan, 2003. "Rent Seeking into the Income Distribution," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 441-456, November.
    3. Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," European Journal of Population, Springer;European Association for Population Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 145-166, June.
    4. Tang, Eddie Wing Yin & Hedley, R Alan, 1998. "Distributional Coalitions, State Strength, and Economic Growth: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Economic Development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 295-323, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Hanegraaff & Arlo Poletti, 2021. "It's economic size, stupid! How global advocacy mirrors state power," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1326-1349, October.
    2. Bown, Chad P. & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Trade liberalization, antidumping, and safeguards: Evidence from India's tariff reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 115-125, September.
    3. Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo.
    4. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2010. "Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 283-305, September.
    5. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2013. "Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 360-386, November.
    6. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2014. "Interest Groups and the “Rise and Decline” of Growth," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 435-456, October.
    7. Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2011. "Special-interest groups and growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 439-457, June.
    8. Mehmet, Babacan, 2009. "Lobbying and Growth: Explaining Differences among OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 29734, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2009.
    9. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2021. "Targeting inflation targeting: the influence of interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 533-554, December.
    10. Robert F. Salvino & Gregory M. Randolph & Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Michael T. Tasto, 2019. "The effects of decentralization on special interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 191-213, December.
    11. Domenico Rossignoli, 2015. "Too many and too much? Special-interest groups and inequality at the turn of the century," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 130(3), pages 337-366.
    12. Murray, Cameron, 2020. "Do political donations buy reputation in an elite gift-exchange game?," OSF Preprints fc9rt, Center for Open Science.
    13. Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2010. "The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 208-221, June.
    14. Bluhm, Richard & Szirmai, Adam, 2012. "Institutions and long-run growth performance: An analytic literature review of the institutional determinants of economic growth," MERIT Working Papers 2012-033, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    15. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Domenico Rossignoli, 2015. "Too many and too much? Special-interest groups and inequality at the turn of the century," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 130(3), pages 337-366.
    2. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
    3. Theresa Hager, 2020. "Special Interest Groups and Growth: A Meta-Analysis of Mancur Olsons Theory," ICAE Working Papers 116, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    4. Simplice A. Asongu & Joseph I. Uduji & Elda N. Okolo-Obasi, 2020. "Drivers and persistence of death in conflicts: global evidence," Working Papers 20/066, European Xtramile Centre of African Studies (EXCAS).
    5. Peter Lorentzen & John McMillan & Romain Wacziarg, 2008. "Death and development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 81-124, June.
    6. Daniel Krcmaric, 2018. "Varieties of civil war and mass killing," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(1), pages 18-31, January.
    7. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, 2016. "The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1802-1848, July.
    8. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    9. Rigterink, Anouk S., 2012. "New Wars in Numbers. An exploration of various datasets on intra-state violence," MPRA Paper 45264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Alou Adessé Dama, 2021. "Exploring Tilly’s Theory : Violent Conflicts and Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa," CERDI Working papers hal-03401539, HAL.
    11. Vitor Melo & Stephen Miller, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Rent-Seeking on income distribution: an analysis of U.S. States and Counties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 99-114, July.
    12. Michael Spagat & Andrew Mack & Tara Cooper & Joakim Kreutz, 2009. "Estimating War Deaths," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 934-950, December.
    13. Hitzhusen, Frederick J. & Jeanty, Pierre Wilner, 2006. "Analyzing the Effects of Conflicts on Food Security in Developing Countries: An Instrumental Variable Panel Data Approach," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21483, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. Topi Miettinen & Olli Ropponen & Pekka Sääskilahti, 2020. "Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1535-1574, October.
    15. Milton Fernando Montoya Pardo, 2020. "Temas de Derecho Minero-Energético. Colección de Regulación Minera y Energética No. 14," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1266, October.
    16. Jennifer Raymond Dresden, 2017. "From combatants to candidates: Electoral competition and the legacy of armed conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 240-263, May.
    17. Helga Malmin Binningsbø & Siri Aas Rustad, 2012. "Sharing the Wealth," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(5), pages 547-566, November.
    18. Silano, Filippo, 2023. "Revolution and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Sandinista Revolution," ILE Working Paper Series 71, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    19. Koppenberg, Maximilian & Mishra, Ashok K. & Hirsch, Stefan, 2023. "Food Aid and Violent Conflict: A Review of Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 16574, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Matthias Busse & Ceren Erdogan & Henning Mühlen, 2016. "China's Impact on Africa – The Role of Trade, FDI and Aid," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 228-262, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    special interest groups; institutional sclerosis; stock returns; volatility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bonnie Wilson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/desluus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.