Determinants of Interest Group Formation
AbstractIt is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation’s stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation, as predicted by theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Saint Louis University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007-03.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Public Choice, December 2007, pages 377-391
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Web page: http://www.slu.edu/x14335.xml
More information through EDIRC
special interest groups; institutional sclerosis; stock returns; volatility;
Other versions of this item:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-09-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CFN-2007-09-02 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-PBE-2007-09-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-09-02 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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