Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses
AbstractOlson (1982) and Putnam (1993) provide sharply conflicting perspectives on the impact of private associations on economic well-being and social conflict. Olson (1982) emphasized their propensity to act as special interest groups that lobby for preferential policies, imposing disproportionate costs on the rest of society. Putnam (1993) viewed memberships in horizontal associations as a source of generalized trust and social ties conducive to governmental efficiency and economic performance. Using cross-country data, this paper investigates the impact of associational memberships on generalized trust and economic performance, finding little support for Olson's view of the impact of groups, and only mixed support for the Putnam perspective. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 117 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.