Special-Interest Groups and Volatility
AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Saint Louis University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007-04.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin, August 21, 2007, Vol. 15, No. 18
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Web page: http://www.slu.edu/x14335.xml
More information through EDIRC
special interest groups; volatility;
Other versions of this item:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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236, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
- Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman, .
"Special-Interest Groups and Growth,"
2007-01, Saint Louis University, Department of Economics.
- Mehmet, Babacan, 2009. "Lobbying and Growth: Explaining Differences among OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 29734, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2009.
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