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Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth

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  • Heckelman, Jac C

Abstract

Empirical studies designed to test Olson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis are typically forced to rely upon proxies to measure the ability of special interest groups to engage in redistributive activities, which in turn are expected to hinder economic growth. This note shows that reliance on proxies biases the estimates toward zero. Here, instrumental variable routines are utilized which increase the estimated impact of special interests on the economy. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 104 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
Pages: 319-27

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:104:y:2000:i:3-4:p:319-27

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2010. "The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 208-221, June.
  2. repec:slu:wpaper:2007-04 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Horgos, Daniel, 2008. "Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence," Working Paper 84/2008, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
  4. Eiji Yamamura, 2012. "Groups and information disclosure: evidence on the Olson and Putnam hypotheses in Japan," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 423-439, May.
  5. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.
  6. Bonnie Wilson & Jac Heckelman & Dennis Coates, 2007. "Special-Interest Groups and Volatility," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(18), pages 1-13.
  7. Butter, Frank A.G. den & Mosch, Robert H.J., 2004. "Externalities of social capital : the role of values, norms and networks," Serie Research Memoranda 0010, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  8. Yamamura, Eiji & Kondoh, Haruo, 2011. "Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004," MPRA Paper 29689, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Groups and information disclosure: Olson and Putnam Hypotheses," MPRA Paper 34628, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. repec:slu:wpaper:2007-01 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
  12. Bourassa, Steven C. & Hoesli, Martin & Scognamiglio, Donato & Zhang, Sumei, 2011. "Land leverage and house prices," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 134-144, March.
  13. Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
  14. Yamamura, Eiji, 2012. "Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure," MPRA Paper 36141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Mehmet, Babacan, 2009. "Lobbying and Growth: Explaining Differences among OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 29734, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2009.
  16. Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2011. "Special-interest groups and growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 439-457, June.

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