Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004
AbstractSince the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29689.
Date of creation: 15 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Information disclosure; Special interest group; Construction expenditure; Rent seeking;
Other versions of this item:
- Eiji Yamamura & Haruo Kondoh, 2013. "Government Transparency And Expenditure In The Rent-Seeking Industry: The Case Of Japan For 1998–2004," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 635-647, 07.
- Eiji Yamamura & Haruo Kondoh, 2012. "Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: The case of Japan for 1998–2004," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2012_13, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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