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The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States

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Author Info
James E. Alt (Department of Government, Harvard University)
David Dreyer Lassen (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
Shanna Rose (Department of Political Science, State University of New York (SUNY) - Stony Brook)

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Abstract

We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the American states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power sharing are associated with both greater levels of fiscal transparency and increases in fiscal transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in particular state government debt and budget imbalance, also appear to affect the level of transparency.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 06-02.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:06-02

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  3. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
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  4. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2004. "Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 377-394, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. R. Gaston Gelos & Shang-Jin Wei, 2005. "Transparency and International Portfolio Holdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2987-3020, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," MPIfG Discussion and Working Papers 6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. [Downloadable!]
  9. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  10. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 401-07, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alessandro Gavazza & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2009. "Transparency and Economic Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(3), pages 1023-1048, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. J. D. Craig & George Kopits, 1998. "Transparency in Government Operations," IMF Occasional Papers 158, International Monetary Fund.
  14. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Murray Petri, 2003. "Promoting Fiscal Transparency The Complementary Roles of the IMF, Financial Markets and Civil Society," IMF Working Papers 03/199, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  17. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2008. "Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States," EPRU Working Paper Series 08-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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