Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable
AbstractDivided government is not only the outcome of moderate voters’ electoral decision to balance party ideology in government, but a more general reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term limited executives (i.e., “lame ducks”) cannot be held accountable due to the missing re-election incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature and restrict his ability to extract rents. Based on US state data I present empirical evidence showing that the probability of divided government is 9 to 15 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3523.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
divided government; lame duck; term limit; accountability;
Other versions of this item:
- Schelker, Mark, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," Economics Working Paper Series 1130, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Mar 2012.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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