Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence
AbstractMancur Olson's theory of the decline of nations is path-breaking in political economics. It has been tested cross-sectionally in numerous empirical studies. We survey the existing results briefly, with a special focus on studies using the number of lobbies as an exogenous variable. Using data from the period 1973-2006, we then present the field's first time-series analysis of the effects of the number of interest groups on the German lobby list and macroeconomic performance, gauged in terms of economic growth and inflation. The number of interest groups (as a proxy for their influence) is shown to have an important impact on macrovariables: Interest group activity significantly leads to a decline in the growth rate and a rise in the inflation rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 84/2008.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Interest groups; economic performance; growth rate; inflation rate;
Other versions of this item:
- Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann, 2009. "Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 301-315, March.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-09-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2008-09-29 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-09-29 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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