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Unanimous Constitutional Consent and the Immigration Problem

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  • Josten, Stefan D.

    ()
    (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

  • Zimmermann, Klaus W.

    ()
    (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

Abstract

This paper utilizes the cross-cutting cleavages approach to evaluate the probability of a unanimous constitutional consent and, based on these results, discusses the implications of immigration on an existing constitutional consent. It is shown that previous conclusions of beneficial effects stemming from a multitude of political dimensions for a unanimous constitutional consent crucially depend on the assumption of an extreme mode of intrapersonal compensation of constitutional majority and minority preferences. These conclusions are reversed once you consider more restrictive schemes of such intrapersonal compensation. Since, furthermore, the probability of constitutional consent unambiguously falls with a growing size of the collectivity, only a policy of selective and controlled immigration will be able to guarantee with regard to the existing cleavages of a society that the existing constitutional consent will not be damaged or destroyed, whereas uncontrolled immigration, possibly based on ethical norms, will risk the breakdown of any constitutional consent in a society.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 31/2004.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2004_031

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  1. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 41-62, July.
  2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
  3. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1996. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1996022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  4. Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.
  2. Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Horgos, Daniel, 2008. "Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence," Working Paper, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg 84/2008, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.

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