Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries
AbstractMancur Olson's theory of institutional sclerosis is based on the notion that the number of interest groups within a country increases with the duration of its political stability. The following paper argues that the increase in the number of interest groups over time could also be a concomitant of economic development. Theoretically, both explanations prove tenable. An empirical cross-sectional regression analysis using data from 21 OECD countries finds no evidence for a significant impact of the duration of political stability on the number of interest groups. A significantly positive effect is, however, reported for the degree of economic development. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 114 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
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