Democracy and Volatility: Do Special-Interest Groups Matter?
AbstractThis paper empirically explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility, with focus on the interplay between groups and democracy and on the impact of groups on policy volatility. We find that countries with more interest groups are characterized by less policy volatility; that the number of interest groups has a direct impact on growth volatility, in addition to an indirect impact through policy volatility; and that interest groups appear to be a channel through which democracy impacts both policy volatility and growth volatility.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Saint Louis University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-01.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision: Aug 2009
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special interest groups; volatility; democracy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-08-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-08-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Berggren, Niclas & Bergh, Andreas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2009.
"The growth effects of institutional instability,"
Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics
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- Francesco Grigoli & Zachary Mills, 2014. "Institutions and public investment: an empirical analysis," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 131-153, May.
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"Special-interest groups and growth,"
Public Choice, Springer,
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- Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary, 2011. "Do high and volatile levels of public investment suggest misconduct ? the role of institutional quality," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 5735, The World Bank.
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