Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information: Collusion in English Auctions with Affiliated Values

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

During an English auction, bidders' behaviour conveys information on their valuation of the prize. So whenever valuations are not independent, a bidder's strategy depends on the price at which his competitors drop out before he does. A ring of bidders can strategically manipulate the information reported through its members' bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and so allow a ring member to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that a ring bidder wins the auction and reduces the price he pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp127.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 127.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2011, Vol. 20(4), 1171-1196
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:127

Contact details of provider:
Postal: I-80126 Napoli
Phone: +39 081 - 675372
Fax: +39 081 - 675372
Email:
Web page: http://www.csef.it/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: auctions; collusion;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:127

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.