Subsidising network technology adoption the case of publishers and E-readers
AbstractTo market a new network technology effectively, manufacturers need to understand the structure and size of network effects associated with the product. If consumers' surplus from adoption depends positively on the number of interconnections in the network, early adopters may need to be subsidized until a critical mass is reached. Moreover, in a two-sided market where platforms and complementary contents are constrained to non-negative prices, subsidies can be provided both by platform manufacturers and byproducers of complementary contents. The article presents a model to analyse adoption dynamics with different subsidies and different stand-alone values for technology. The model shows that if the standalone value of technology is limited, subsidies from complementary contents producers may be pivotal to reach the critical mass. Moreover, under given conditions, this type of subsidies can lead to a more efficient adoption, increasing social welfare. In this case, assuming a monopolist platform manufacturer of the technology, complete contracts are needed to reach the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
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Date of creation: 11 Jun 2012
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two-sided markets; network effects; technology adoption; copyright; vertical relations; media economics;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-07-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CUL-2012-07-14 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2012-07-14 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-MKT-2012-07-14 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2012-07-14 (Network Economics)
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