Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Gradual Response
AbstractThe digitization of copyrighted goods and the dematerialization of their distribution over the Internet have weakened copyright, a key institution of the creative industries. One factor affecting the value of copyright stems from the broadband roll-out, wherein copyright enforcement costs have become higher than the estimated benefits of copyright. This paper analyzes the causes of this situation and suggests how a graduated response to infringers may durably decrease copyright enforcement costs. Beginning with a review of the economic literature on copyright focusing on its industrial aspects, the study then analyzes how the consumers' impunity provides incentives to “free ride” on copyright all along the vertical distribution chain. This rapidly increases copyright enforcement costs. Next, the paper describes both the graduated response mechanism and the voluntary agreement which initiated this system in France. In conclusion, this study argues that increasing the cost of free-riding for the final consumer should lead to a decrease of copyright enforcement costs and, therefore, higher returns in the creative industries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00446189.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2009, 6, 2, 13-29
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00446189/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Copyright; Creative industries; Regulation enforcement costs; Digitization; Graduated response.;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-63, June.
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Copying and Copyright," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 121-138, Spring.
- Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
- Matttia De' Grassi Di Pianura, 2012. "Subsidising network technology adoption the case of publishers and E-readers," Working Papers hal-00714447, HAL.
- Olivier Bomsel, 2013.
"Copyright and brands in the digital age: Internalizing the externalities of meaning,"
- Olivier P. Bomsel, 2013. "Copyright And Brands In The Digital Age: Internalizing The Externalities Of Meaning," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 126-134, 01.
- Olivier BOMSEL, 2011. "Do you speak European ? Media Economics, Multilingualism and the Digital Single Market," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(82), pages 43-62, 2nd quart.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.