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Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective

In: Handbook of Economic Growth

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  • Ogilvie, Sheilagh
  • Carus, A.W.

Abstract

This chapter surveys the historical evidence on the role of institutions in economic growth and points out weaknesses in a number of stylized facts widely accepted in the growth literature. It shows that private-order institutions have not historically substituted for public-order ones in enabling markets to function; that parliaments representing wealth holders have not invariably been favorable for growth; and that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England did not mark the sudden emergence of either secure property rights or economic growth. Economic history has been used to support both the centrality and the irrelevance of secure property rights to growth, but the reason for this is conceptual vagueness. Secure property rights require much more careful analysis, distinguishing between rights of ownership, use, and transfer, and between generalized and particularized variants. Similar careful analysis would, we argue, clarify the growth effects of other institutions, including contract-enforcement mechanisms, guilds, communities, serfdom, and the family. Greater precision concerning institutional effects on growth can be achieved by developing sharper criteria of application for conventional institutional labels, endowing institutions with a scale of intensity or degree, and recognizing that the effects of each institution depend on its relationship with other components of the wider institutional system.

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  • Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of Economic Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2, Fall.
    This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Economic Growth with number 2-403.

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    Keywords: Institutions; Economic growth; Economic history; Private-order institutions; Public-order institutions; Parliaments; Property rights; Contract enforcement; Guilds; Serfdom; The family; Maghribi traders; Champagne fairs; N01; N03; N04; N07; O17; P00;

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