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The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany

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  • Volckart, Oliver

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.

Volume (Year): 41 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 282-299

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Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:41:y:2004:i:3:p:282-299

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830

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References

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  1. Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, 1999. "Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 427-450, January.
  2. Oliver Volckart, 2002. "No Utopia: Government Without Territorial Monopoly in Medieval Central Europe," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 325-, June.
  3. Greif, Avner, 2000. "The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(03), pages 251-284, December.
  4. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Arbitration in International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
  6. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, 03.
  7. Brennan, Geoffrey & Pettit, Philip, 2000. "The hidden economy of esteem," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(01), pages 77-98, April.
  8. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
  9. Hoffman, Philip T. & Postel-Vinay, Gilles & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2001. "Priceless Markets," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226348018.
  10. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lars Boerner & Oliver Volckart, 2010. "The utility of a common coinage: currency unions and the integration of money markets in late medieval Central Europe," Economic History Working Papers 29409, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  2. Oliver Volckart, 2006. "The Influence of Information Costs on the Integration of Financial Markets: Northern Europe, 1350-1560," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-049, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  3. David Chilosi, 2013. "Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy," Economic History Working Papers 50815, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  4. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "'Whatever Is, Is Right'?, Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe (Tawney Lecture 2006)," CESifo Working Paper Series 2066, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2008. "The economic history of sovereignty: communal responsibility, the extended family, and the firm," Economic History Working Papers 22307, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  6. Hassani Mahmooei, Behrooz & Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2012. "Dueling for honor and identity economics," MPRA Paper 44370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Avner Greif, 2006. "History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 221-236, Spring.
  8. David Chilosi & Oliver Volckart, 2009. "Money, states and empire: financial integration cycles and institutional change in Central Europe, 1400-1520," Economic History Working Papers 27884, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  9. Koyama, Mark, 2012. "The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England," MPRA Paper 40500, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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