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Private ordering, collective action, and the self-enforcing range of contracts

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  • Armelle Mazé

    ()

  • Claude Ménard

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 131-153

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:29:y:2010:i:1:p:131-153

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

Related research

Keywords: Contract law; Private enforcement; Transaction costs; Self-regulation; Coalitions; Cartels; Collective organization; K12; D23; D74; L14; Q13;

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References

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  1. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  2. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
  3. Jill E. Hobbs, 1997. "Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1083-1095.
  4. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
  5. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  6. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
  7. Libecap, Gary D, 1992. "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 242-62, April.
  8. James A. Chalfant & Richard J. Sexton, 2002. "Marketing Orders, Grading Errors, and Price Discrimination," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(1), pages 53-66.
  9. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, 9.
  10. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  11. Wang, Ruqu, 1995. "Bargaining versus posted-price selling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1747-1764, December.
  12. Alston, Lee J. & Libecap, Gary D. & Mueller, Bernardo, 1999. "A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform policy in Brazil," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 135-160, May.
  13. Menard, Claude, 1998. "Maladaptation of regulation to hybrid organizational forms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 403-417, December.
  14. Sergio G. Lazzarini, 2004. "Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 261-298, October.
  15. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
  16. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1998. "The Nature of the Farm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 343-86, October.
  17. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, . "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy yale_lepp-1011, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  18. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 637-58, October.
  19. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-31, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Baptiste Traversac & Hervé Lanotte, 2011. "An economic history of the Champagne contracts, lessons for regional development," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1145, European Regional Science Association.

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