IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/soecon/v65y1999i3p427-450.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?

Author

Listed:
  • Oliver Volckart
  • Antje Mangels

Abstract

This article analyzes how trade was conducted between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. We claim that, as most exchange was simultaneous, differences between law codes did not pose a substantial problem and that mercantile guilds developed not to provide institutions comparable to the modern lex mercatoria, but rather to supply physical security. The development of nonsimultaneous exchange was made possible predominantly by the emergence of urban autonomy and urban law applicable to all merchants trading within town, so it appears that the importance of universally accepted commercial institutions in the Middle Ages has hitherto been vastly overrated.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, 1999. "Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 427-450, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1999:i:3:p:427-450
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00169.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00169.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00169.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. North, Douglass C., 1979. "A framework for analyzing the state in economic history," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 249-259, July.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Alessandra Casella, 1992. "Arbitration in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 4136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Spontaneous Order," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 1, pages 1-9, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    6. Cooter, Robert D., 1996. "The theory of market modernization of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 141-172, June.
    7. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
    8. Bruce Benson, 1992. "Customary law as a social contract: International commercial law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-27, December.
    9. Lopez,Robert S., 1976. "The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521290463.
    10. Gregory B. Christainsen, 1990. "Law as a Discovery Procedure," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(3), pages 497-530, Winter.
    11. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    2. Volckart, Oliver, 2004. "The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 282-299, July.
    3. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, March.
    4. Licht Amir N., 2008. "Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 715-750, December.
    5. Haucap, Justus, 2017. "The rule of law and the emergence of market exchange: A new institutional economic perspective," DICE Discussion Papers 276, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    6. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    7. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade, Institutions, and Credit," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 495-521, October.
    8. Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107025806.
    9. Brousseau, Eric & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "“Climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules”: A life-cycle theory of institutional evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 65-79.
    10. Cristina Bicchieri, 2002. "Covenants without Swords," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 192-228, May.
    11. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
    12. Peter T. Leeson, 2006. "Cooperation and Conflict," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 891-907, October.
    13. Zdybel, Karol B., 2023. "Spontaneous Norms in Law and Economics: A Sketch Typology," ILE Working Paper Series 66, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    14. Peter T. Leeson, 2009. "The Laws of Lawlessness," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 471-503, June.
    15. Sanchez-Pages Santiago & Straub Stéphane, 2010. "The Emergence of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, September.
    16. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2015. "Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 287-305, March.
    17. Andrew W. Bausch, 2014. "Evolving intergroup cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 369-393, December.
    18. Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
    19. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private ordering, collective action, and the self-enforcing range of contracts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 131-153, February.
    20. Berkowitz, Daniel & Pistor, Katharina & Richard, Jean-Francois, 2003. "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 165-195, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1999:i:3:p:427-450. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)2325-8012 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.