Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain
AbstractDuring Britain’s industrialization, Parliament operated a forum where rights to land and resources could be reorganized. This venue enabled landholders and communities to exploit economic opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited from the past. In this essay, historical evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis demonstrate that Parliament increased the number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to increases in the demand for such acts. Tests with placebo groups confirm the robustness of this result. This evidence indicates that Parliament responded elastically to changes in the public’s demand for reorganizing property rights. Parliament’s efforts to adapt property rights to modern economic conditions may have accelerated Britain’s economic ascent.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 54 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 241 - 274
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Daniel Bogart & Gary Richardson, 2010. "Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain," NBER Working Papers 15697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
- N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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