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Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690 1790

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  • Sussman, Nathan
  • Yafeh, Yishay

Abstract

We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690 1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 66 (2006)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
Pages: 906-935

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Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:66:y:2006:i:04:p:906-935_00

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Cited by:
  1. Ogilvie, Sheilagh & Carus, A.W., 2014. "Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 403-513 Elsevier.
  2. Dan Bogart, 2009. "Did the Glorious Revolution Contribute to the Transport Revolution? Evidence from Investment in Roads and Rivers," Working Papers 080918, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Kim Oosterlinck, 2013. "Sovereign debt defaults: insights from history," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 697-714, WINTER.
  4. Noel D., Johnson & Mark, Koyama, 2012. "Standardizing the fiscal state: cabal tax farming as an Intermediate Institution in early-modern England and France," MPRA Paper 40403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Stephen Quinn, 2008. "Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750," Working Papers 200701, Texas Christian University, Department of Economics.
  6. Eugene Kandel & Konstantin Kosenko & Randall Morck & Yishay Yafeh, 2013. "Business Groups in the United States: A Revised History of Corporate Ownership, Pyramids and Regulation, 1930-1950," NBER Working Papers 19691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Vesperoni , Alberto, 2013. "War Finance and the Modern State," NEPS Working Papers 6/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
  8. Cox, Gary W., 2012. "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(03), pages 567-600, September.
  9. Irigoin, A & Grafe, R, 2012. "Bounded Leviathan: or why North & Weingast are only right on the right half," MPRA Paper 39722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Maria Alejandra Irigoin & Regina Grafe, 2012. "Bounded Leviathan: or why North and Weingast are only right on the right half," Economic History Working Papers 44492, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  11. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau & Jacques-Marie Vaslin, 2013. "Waterloo: a Godsend for French Public Finances?," Working Papers 0041, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
  12. Mauricio Drelichman & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Debt Sustainability in Historical Perspective: The Role of Fiscal Repression," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 657-667, 04-05.
  13. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
  14. Dan Bogart, 2008. "Competition and Commitment: the Supply and Enforcement of Rights to Improve Roads and Rivers in England, 1600-1750," Working Papers 070817, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  15. David Chilosi, 2013. "Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy," Economic History Working Papers 50815, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.

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