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Country Insurance

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Author Info
Tito Cordella (International Monetary Fund)
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (International Monetary Fund)

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan Journals in its journal IMF Staff Papers.

Volume (Year): 52 (2005)
Issue (Month): si ()
Pages: 6
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Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:52:y:2005:i:si:p:6

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.), Capital Flows and the International Financial System Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Timothy D. Lane & Steven Phillips, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Jeffrey Sachs & Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, 1996. "The Mexican Peso Crisis: Sudden Death or Death Foretold?," NBER Working Papers 5563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Guillermo A. Calvo & Alejandro Izquierdo & Ernesto Talvi, 2003. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate, and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," NBER Working Papers 9828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Isabel Schnabel & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The case for GDP-indexed bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 165-216, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jonathan Kearns & Ricardo J. Caballero & Kevin Cowan, 2004. "Fear of Sudden Stops: lessons from Australia and Chile," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 185, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm339, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Alejandro Izquierdo, 2002. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability in Argentina," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(7), pages 903-923, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Roberto Chang & Andrés Velasco, 2001. "A Model Of Financial Crises In Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 489-517, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. De la Torre, Augusto & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2003. "Living and dying with hard pegs : the rise and fall of Argentina's currency board," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2980, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2006. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Working Papers 12235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 2(14), pages 1-41. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Kletzer, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1026, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  5. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2009. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Business School Working Papers 2009-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2006. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers liquid, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Jan Willem Gunning, 2005. "Pourquoi donner de l'aide ?," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 19(2), pages 7-50. [Downloadable!]
  9. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  10. Miguel A. Kiguel & Alain Ize & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 05/188, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ronald U. Mendoza, 2007. "A Compendium of Policy Instruments to Enhance Financial Stability and Debt Management in Emerging Market Economies," Working Papers 48, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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