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Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?

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Author Info
Stephen Morris () (Yale University, Cowles Foundation)
Hyun Song Shin () (University of London, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Accounting and Finance)

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Abstract

n a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm339.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm339

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Related research
Keywords: Moral Hazard; Financial Crisis; International Financial Architecture; Global Games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 290, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2005. "The IMF and the Mobilization of Foreign Aid," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 1105, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  3. José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  5. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Juan Zalduendo & Uma Ramakrishnan, 2006. "The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 06/75, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Macroeconomics 0308002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ashoka Mody & Barry J. Eichengreen & Kenneth Kletzer, 2005. "The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets," IMF Working Papers 05/84, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Manuela Goretti, 2005. "The Brazilian currency turmoil of 2002: a nonlinear analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(4), pages 289-306. [Downloadable!]
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  11. John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2009. "Equilibrium Selection in Static and Dynamic Entry Games," Working Papers 376, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
  12. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2009. "Optimal Debt? On the Insurance Value of International Debt Flows to Developing Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 489-507, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Emine Boz, 2009. "Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs," IMF Working Papers 09/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  14. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  15. Adrian Penalver, . "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  16. Jun Il Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/156, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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