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International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality

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Author Info
Jeanne, Olivier
Zettelmeyer, Jeromin

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Abstract

The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for different reasons, in particular for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue in this paper that some of these concerns are exaggerated or misleading because international bailouts have no or very little cost to the international community and the global taxpayer. The problem, in our view, is rather to ensure that the international safety net is not used as an input into bad domestic policies. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 563.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_563

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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  1. Andrew G Haldane & J"rg Scheibe, . "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jong-Wha Lee & Kwanho Shin, 2005. "IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard," International Finance 0501005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  4. David Benjamin & Mark L. J. Wright, 2009. "Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory Of Delays In Sovereign Debt Renegotiations," CAMA Working Papers 2009-15, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice around the World," IMF Working Papers 03/13, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 290, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," HEI Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
  8. Aaron Tornell, 2002. "The Credit Channel in Middle Income Countries (October 2002), with Frank Westermann," UCLA Economics Online Papers 216, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Aaron Tornell, 2003. "Credit Market Imperfections in Middle Income Countries (January 2003)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 244, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, 2001. "The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?," NBER Working Papers 8381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jun Il Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 07/104, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  14. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Adrian Penalver, . "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  16. Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2006. "Positive effects of fiscal expansions on growth and debt," MPRA Paper 1432, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
  17. Gregor Irwin & David Vines, . "The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 233, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Dollars, Debt and the IFIs: Dedollarizing Multilateral Lending," Business School Working Papers dedollmultlending, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  19. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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