Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard
In: Capital Flows and the International Financial System
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This chapter was published in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.) Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages , 1999.
This item is provided by Reserve Bank of Australia in its series RBA Annual Conference Volume with number acv1999-13.
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