Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kenneth Rogoff

Abstract

This paper asks how recent developments in research on banking and sovereign lending can help inform the debate on choosing a new international financial architecture. A broad range of plans is considered, including a global lender of last resort facility, an international bankruptcy court, an international debt insurance corporation, and unilateral controls on capital flows.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7265.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7265.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 21-42.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7265

Note: IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. James Tobin, 1978. "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 506, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 5191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1994. "Preventing Financial Crises: An International Perspective," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 4636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Maurice Obstfeld, 1992. "Risk-taking, global diversification, and growth," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 61, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  6. Sebastian Edwards, 2000. "Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some Latin American Experiences," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory, Evidence, and Controversies, pages 197-246 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Cole, Harold L & Kehoe, Timothy J, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116, January.
  8. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  9. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Cleaning Up Third World Debt without Getting Taken to the Cleaners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, Winter.
  10. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
  11. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
  13. Chang, R. & Velasco, A., 1998. "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 98-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  14. Caprio, Gerard, Jr. & Honohan, Patrick, 1999. "Beyond capital ideals : restoring banking stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 2235, The World Bank.
  15. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff & Afonso S. Bevilaqua, 1992. "Official Creditor Seniority and Burden-Sharing in the Former Soviet Bloc," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1), pages 195-234.
  16. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and Transient Beliefs: Reviving reputation Models of Debt," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 5486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Morris Goldstein, 1997. "Case for an International Banking Standard, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa47, July.
  18. Walter B. Wriston, 1998. "Dumb Networks and Smart Capital," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), Winter.
  19. Philippe Martin & Helene Rey, 2000. "Financial super-markets: size matters for asset trade," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 20197, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  20. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1995. "The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 45-64, February.
  21. Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  22. Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Trade in Risky Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 375-94, June.
  23. Kehoe, Patrick J., 1987. "Coordination of fiscal policies in a world economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 349-376, May.
  24. Allan H. Meltzer, 1998. "Asian Problems and the IMF," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 264-274, Winter.
  25. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  26. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
  27. Ventura, Jaume, 1997. "Growth and Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 57-84, February.
  28. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1426, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
  30. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, December.
  31. Morris Goldstein, 1998. "The Asian Financial Crisis," Policy Briefs, Peterson Institute for International Economics PB98-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  32. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Asking the right questions about the IMF," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pages 3-26.
  33. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
  34. English, William B, 1996. "Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 259-75, March.
  35. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.