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The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt

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Author Info
Harold L. Cole
Patrick J. Kehoe

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Abstract

A standard explanation for why sovereign governments repay their debts is that they must maintain a good reputation to easily borrow more. We show that the ability of reputation to support debt depends critically on the assumptions made about institutions. At one extreme, we assume that bankers can default on payments they owe to governments. At the other, we assume that bankers are committed to honoring contracts made with governments. We show that if bankers can default, then a government gets enduring benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers and its reputation can support a large amount of borrowing. If, however, bankers must honor their contracts, then a government gets only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship and its reputation can support zero borrowing.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 179.

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Date of creation: 1994
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:179

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Keywords: Debts; External;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harold L. Cole & James Dow & William B. English, 1994. "Default, settlement, and signalling: lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt," Staff Report 180, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kletzer, K.M. & Wright, B.D., 1990. "Sovereign Debt Renegotiation In A Consumption-Smoothing Model," Papers 610, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  7. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and Transient Beliefs: Reviving reputation Models of Debt," NBER Working Papers 5486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006. "Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturity," RES Working Papers 4459, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christian Hellwig & Guido Lorenzoni, 2006. "Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000383, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2006. "Has the Legal Threat to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Become Real?," Business School Working Papers legalthreat, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  4. Drelichman, Mauricio & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2009. "Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt and Default in the Age of Philip II, 1556-1598," CEPR Discussion Papers 7276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2008. "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," NBER Working Papers 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," NBER Working Papers 7265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Carlos de Resende, 2006. "Endogenous Borrowing Constraints and Consumption Volatility in a Small Open Economy," Working Papers 06-37, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  8. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1997. "Models of sovereign debt: partial vs. general reputations," Working Papers 580, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kenneth Kletzer, 2003. "Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention," IMF Working Papers 03/134, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. André Lince de Faria & Paolo Mauro, 2005. "Institutions and the External Capital Structure of Countries," IMF Working Papers 04/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Yi Jin & Ted Temzelides, 2004. "On the Local Interaction of Money and Credit," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(1), pages 143-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Michael Bleaney, . "The Currency Denomination Of Sovereign Debt," Discussion Papers 06/02, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006. "Deuda soberana: indexación y vencimiento," RES Working Papers 4460, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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