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Beyond capital ideals : restoring banking stability

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Author Info
Caprio, Gerard, Jr.
Honohan, Patrick

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Abstract

The authors examine why emerging markets, in particular, are susceptible to and affected by financial difficulties. They show that these difficulties have a richer, more complex structure than they are sometimes believed to have - with marked information asymmetries and substantial volatility. The sources of heightened regulatory failure in emerging markets in recent years include the volatility of real and nominal shocks, the difficulty of operating in uncharted territory after financial liberalization and other changes in regime, and the political pressures that can inhibit the enforcement of prudential regulation. The authors discuss what stronger regulation can and cannot accomplish, as well as options to improve the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants. They probe the shortcomings of a regulatory paradigm that relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy and discuss the possible intermittent application of supplementary"blunt instruments"as an interim solution while longer-term reforms are being put in place. Certain well-worn messages remain valid, but are respected more in theory than in practice. There would be fewer problems, the authors say, if there were: 1) more diversification; 2) more balanced financial structures (for example, as between debt and equity); 3) more foreign banks in emerging markets'financial systems; and 4) better enforcement of both contracts and regulations. Participants in the financial sector will constantly try to get around rules that limit their profitability, so regulation must be seen as an evolutionary struggle. Prevention of financial failure is not costless, and a heavy repressive hand is not warranted. But a richer regulatory palette can be used to protect financial systems more successfully against crisis while preserving the systems'growth-enhancing effectiveness.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2235.

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Date of creation: 30 Nov 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2235

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Related research
Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Financial Intermediation; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Intermediation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Environmental Economics&Policies;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kane, Edward J., 1995. "Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 431-459, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 1998. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-32, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1993-2), pages 1-74. [Downloadable!]
  4. María Soledad Martínez & Sergio Schmukler, 1999. "Do Depositors Punish Banks For "Bad" Behavior?: Examining Market Discipline In Argentina, Chile, And Mexico," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 48, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sebastian Edwards, 1998. "Capital Inflows into Latin America: A Stop-Go Story?," NBER Working Papers 6441, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Patrick Honohan, 1997. "Banking system failures in developing and transition countries: Diagnosis and predictions," BIS Working Papers 39, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
  7. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Caprio Jr., Gerard, 1997. "Safe and sound banking in developing countries : we're not in Kansas anymore," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1739, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993. "Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1083, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Ricardo Hausmann & Michael Gavin, 1996. "Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock Prone Region: The Policy Challenge for Latin America," RES Working Papers 4020, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  11. Berger, Allen N. & Herring, Richard J. & Szego, Giorgio P., 1995. "The role of capital in financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 393-430, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Jason Furman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1998. "Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1998-2), pages 1-136. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "Asset Sales and Debt Capacity," NBER Working Papers 3618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Robert DeYoung & Mark J. Flannery & William W. Lang & Sorin M. Sorescu, 1998. "The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners," Working Paper Series WP-98-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  15. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Norman Loayza, 1999. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 56, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Demirguc-Kent, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1998. "Financial liberalization and financial fragility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1917, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1998. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(4), pages 745-70, November.
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," NBER Working Papers 7265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Honohan, Patrick, 2002. "Banking policy and macroeconomic stability - an exploration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2856, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Elina Ribakova, 2005. "Liberalization, Prudential Supervision, and Capital Requirements: The Policy Trade-Offs," IMF Working Papers 05/136, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Islam, Roumeen, 2000. "Should capital flows be regulated? - a look at the issues and policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2293, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marco Del Negro & Stephen Kay, 2002. "Global banks, local crises: bad news from Argentina," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q3, pages 89-106. [Downloadable!]
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