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The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners

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Author Info
Robert DeYoung
Mark J. Flannery
William W. Lang
Sorin M. Sorescu

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Abstract

Large commercial banking firms are monitored by specialized private sector monitors and by specialized government examiners. Previous research suggests that bank exams produce little useful information that is not already reflected in market prices. In this article, we apply a new research methodology to a unique data set, and find that government exams of large national banks produce significant new information which financial markets do not fully internalize for several additional months. Our results indicate that specialized government monitors can identify value-relevant information about private firms, even if those firms are already actively followed by investors and their private-sector agents.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Working Paper Series with number WP-98-4.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-98-4

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Keywords: Bank supervision ; Bank examination;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 641-670.
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  2. Rebel Cole & Jeffery Gunther, 1998. "Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 103-117, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brennan, Michael J. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1995. "Investment analysis and price formation in securities markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 361-381, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Carter, Richard B & Manaster, Steven, 1990. " Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1045-67, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lummer, Scott L. & McConnell, John J., 1989. "Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 99-122, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Edward J. Kane, 1991. "Dissecting current legislative proposals for deposit insurance reform," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pages 126-135.
  9. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. " Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 57-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, . "Investment Banking, Reputation and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 2-85, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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  11. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1986. "Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 31-60. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Billett, Matthew T & Flannery, Mark J & Garfinkel, Jon A, 1995. " The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 699-718, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rochet, Jean Charles & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. anonymous, 2000. "Improving public disclosure in banking," Staff Studies 173, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  3. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2006. "Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from the regulatory capital mix," Staff Reports 244, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," Working Paper 2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon & Robert DeYoung, 2000. "Efficient Risk-Taking and Regulatory Covenant Enforcement in a Deregulated Banking Industry," Departmental Working Papers 200007, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Elena Rouse, 2000. "Using market valuation to assess the importance and efficiency of public school spending," Working Paper Series WP-00-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 2000. "Identifying the macroeconomic effect of loan supply shocks," Working Papers 00-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Caprio, Gerard, Jr. & Honohan, Patrick, 1999. "Beyond capital ideals : restoring banking stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2235, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  10. Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2001. "Using subordinated debt to monitor bank holding companies: is it feasible?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  11. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2001. "Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings," Working Paper 2001-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Gerard Caprio & Patrick Honohan, 1999. "Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital Requirements," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 43-64, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  14. Catharine Lemieux, 2003. "Network vulnerabilities and risks in the retail payment system," Emerging Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  15. John S. Jordan & Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1999. "Impact of greater bank disclosure amidst a banking crisis," Working Papers 99-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  16. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Using bank supervisory data to improve macroeconomic forecasts," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 21-32. [Downloadable!]
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