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Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?

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  • Michael P. Dooley

Abstract

Recent financial crises in emerging markets have been followed by temporary but substantial losses in output. This paper explores the possibility that threats of such losses are the dominant incentive for repayment of international debt. In this environment private debtors and creditors have strong incentives to design international contracts so that renegotiation is costly. Such contracts generate dead weight losses and proposals for reform of the international monetary system that modify explicit and implicit contractual arrangements and can be welfare improving under special circumstances. However, such proposals might also weaken the incentives that make private international debt possible.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7531.

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Date of creation: Feb 2000
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Publication status: published as Dooley, Michael P. "International Financial Architecture And Strategic Default: Can Financial Crises Be Less Painful?," Carnegic-Rochester Conference Series on Public PolicyP, 2000, v53(1), 361-377.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7531

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  8. Richard N. Cooper, 1992. "Economic Stabilization and Debt in Developing Countries," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031876, December.
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