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Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture

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  • Olivier Jeanne

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt, and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. The analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries, but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as international lending-in-last-resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries. (JEL F34, O19)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.5.2135
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 99 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 2135-48

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:2135-48

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2135
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