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Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises

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  • Michael P. Dooley
  • Sujata Verma

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the third party (the IMF) in resolving sovereign default on external debt. We first show that the effects of third party intervention in debt negotiations are quite sensitive to the assumed enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt. The model is then adapted to an insurance crisis. The main result is that the unanticipated component of third party intervention can either intensify or mitigate the dead weight loss following default.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael P. Dooley & Sujata Verma, 2001. "Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises," NBER Working Papers 8315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8315
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    Cited by:

    1. David Fernando LOPEZ ANGARITA, 2006. "Nivel óptimo de Reservas Internacionales y crisis cambiaria en Colombia," Archivos de Economía 3273, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
    2. Gai, Prasanna & Hayes, Simon & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 245-262, March.
    3. Mohammed Aliu Momoh & Maurice Aghedo, 2018. "Public Private Partnership, Infrastructure Guarantee and Sovereign Debt Default," Romanian Economic Business Review, Romanian-American University, vol. 13(1), pages 25-34, March.
    4. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 16125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. David Fernando López Angarita, 2006. "Nivel de reservas internacionales y riesgo cambiario en Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 117-159, July-Dece.
    6. Claessens,Constantijn A. & Klingebiel, Daniela & Laeven, Luc, 2004. "Resolving systemic financial crisis : policies and institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3377, The World Bank.
    7. Banerjee, Anurag & Hung, Chi-Hsiou Daniel & Lo, Kai Lisa, 2016. "An anatomy of credit risk transfer between sovereign and financials in the Eurozone crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 102-120.
    8. Arteta, Carlos & Hale, Galina, 2008. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 53-69, January.
    9. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
    10. Frankel, Jeffrey, 2010. "Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1439-1520, Elsevier.
    11. Suheyla Ozyildirim & Bulent Yaman, 2005. "Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(13), pages 1557-1569.
    12. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    13. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2004. "The Simple Case For Collective Action Clauses," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 3(3), pages 237-248, Septiembr.
    14. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Staff Working Papers 07-10, Bank of Canada.
    15. De Paoli, Biana & Hoggarth, Glenn & Saporta, Victoria, 2006. "Financial Stability Paper No 1: Costs of Sovereign Default," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 1, Bank of England.
    16. Sergio Masciantonio, 2005. "The Role of Preference Structure and Moral Hazard in a Multiple Equilibria. Model of Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 135-165, November-.

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