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Politics and Economics in the Eighties

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  • Alberto Alesina
  • Geoffrey Carliner

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This book is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Books with number ales91-1 and published in 1991.

Order: http://www.nber.org/books/ales91-1
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberbk:ales91-1

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Cited by:
  1. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-98, December.
  2. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
  3. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Working Papers 7582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," NBER Working Papers 16107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994," Working Papers, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics 141, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  7. Derek Hung Chiat Chen, 2003. "Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the budget deficit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3086, The World Bank.
  8. von Hagen, Jürgen, 1998. "Budgeting institutions for aggregate fiscal discipline," ZEI Working Papers B 01-1998, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  10. Philip Keefer, 2001. "Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: the Effects of Political Checks and Balances," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, Central Bank of Chile 119, Central Bank of Chile.
  11. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 3-19, Summer.
  12. Robert Boyer, 1998. "De « La Théorie Générale » à la Nouvelle Économie Classique : Une réflexion sur la nouveauté en macroéconomie," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(1), pages 7-56.
  13. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
  14. Stanley Winer & Michael Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John Aldrich, 2008. "Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 415-448, June.
  15. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3439, The World Bank.
  16. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.

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