1. Andrew G Haldane & J"rg Scheibe, . "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
2. Timothy D. Lane & Steven Phillips, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
3. Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, . "International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 217, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ashley Taylor & Prasanna Gai, 2004. "International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 561, Econometric Society.
   • Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, 2004. "International financial rescues and debtor country moral hazard," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 34, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
   • Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, 2004. "International Financial Rescues and Debtor-Country Moral Hazard," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(3), pages 391-420, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
5. Bird, Graham & Hussain, Mumtaz & Joyce, Joseph P., 2004. "Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-251, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2002. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," NBER Working Papers 8951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2003. "IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," Departmental Working Papers 2003-09, Australian National University, Economics RSPAS. [Downloadable!]
   • Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005. "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
9. Yung Chul Park & Yunjong Wang, 2002. "What Kind of International Financial Architecture for an Integrated World Economy?," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 91-128. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Isabel Schnabel & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
11. Ashoka Mody & Diego Saravia, 2005. "Catalyzing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programs Work as Commitment Devices?," Documentos de Trabajo 280, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
12. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2004. "Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 247-264, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Oscar Bernal & Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, 2009. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Working Papers DULBEA 09-01.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oscar Bernal & Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, 2008. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," Working Papers CEB 08-015.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
   • BERNAL DIAZ, Oscar & OOSTERLINCK, Kim & SZAFARZ, Ariane, 2009. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," ULB Institutional Repository 09-01.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles. [Downloadable!]
   • BERNAL DIAZ, Oscar & OOSTERLINCK, Kim & SZAFARZ, Ariane, 2008. "Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun," ULB Institutional Repository 08-015.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles. [Downloadable!]
2. Heppke-Falk, Kirsten H. & Wolff, Guntram B., 2007. "Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations: evidence for the German Länder," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2007,07, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Bail-Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 425-446, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)