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A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement

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Author Info
Chami, Ralph
Sharma, Sunil
Shim, Ilhyock

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Abstract

The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF´s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan´s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear´s dilemma. --

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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2007-26.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5731

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Related research
Keywords: IMF; coinsurance arrangement; moral hazard; Samaritan´s dilemma; King Lear´s dilemma;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Business School Working Papers countryinsurance, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James M. Boughton, 2004. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas that Have Shaped the Institution," IMF Working Papers 04/75, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jeanne, Olivier & Wyplosz, Charles, 2001. "The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.), Capital Flows and the International Financial System Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-82, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Mohsin S. Khan & Sunil Sharma, 2001. "IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs," IMF Working Papers 01/142, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Hendrik JØrges, 2000. "Of rotten kids and Rawlsian parents: The optimal timing of intergenerational transfers," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 147-157. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Jaewoo Lee, 2004. "Insurance Value of International Reserves: An Option Pricing Approach," IMF Working Papers 04/175, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Chami, Ralph, 1996. "King Lear's dilemma: Precommitment versus the last word," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 171-176, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 1999. "Under what circumstances, past and present, have international rescues of countries in financial distress been successful?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 683-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ales Bulir & Atish R. Ghosh & A. Javier Hamann & Timothy D. Lane & Alex Mourmouras & Marianne Schulze-Gattas, 2002. "IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises: Design and Experience," IMF Occasional Papers 210, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Barry Eichengreen, 2006. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," NBER Working Papers 12451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2006. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Working Papers 12235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Anna Ivanova, 2006. "Outcomes-Based Conditionality: Its Role and Optimal Design," IMF Working Papers 06/128, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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