Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
AbstractWe examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a playerâ€™s actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radnerâ€™s ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 53 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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