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Recursive global games

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  • Flavio Toxvaerd
  • Chryssi Giannitsarou

Abstract

The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 with number 104.

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Date of creation: 27 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:104

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Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/afm/mmf/index.html

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  1. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Anonymous Sequential Games," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  2. Curtat, Laurent O., 1996. "Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-199, December.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
  4. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2025, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  8. Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan, 1992. "Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 543-562.
  9. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine.
  11. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination in a Mobile World," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp295, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  12. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination Cycles," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 162, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Durlauf, Steven N, 1991. "Multiple Equilibria and Persistence in Aggregate Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 70-74, May.
  15. Daisuke Oyama, 2004. "Booms And Slumps In A Game Of Sequential Investment With The Changing Fundamentals," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 311-320.
  16. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1490, Econometric Society.
  17. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination of mobile labor," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 25-46, March.
  18. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea, 2009. "Membership in citizen groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 217-232, September.
  2. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  3. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2008. "Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk," NBER Working Papers 13964, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination Cycles," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 162, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  5. Yamin Ahmad & Pietro Cova & Rodrigo Harrison, 2004. "Foreign Direct Investment versus Portfolio Investment : A Global Games Approach," Working Papers, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics 05-03, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics.
  6. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (August 2006, with George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 279, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Guillermo L. Ordoñez, 2009. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 431, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Information aggregation and investment cycles with strategic complementarity," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 281-311, May.
  10. COLLA, Paolo & GARCIA, Filomena, 2004. "Technology adoption with forward looking agents," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2004041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1497, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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