-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
AbstractWe introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997
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- John H. Nachbar, 2003.
"Beliefs in Repeated Games,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0597, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Thomas Norman, 2012. "Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity," Economics Series Working Papers 602, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L., 2002.
"Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria,"
5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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