Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity
AbstractIf players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their strategies eventually approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated game under an absolute-continuity assumption on their prior beliefs.� We suppose here that Bayesian learners do not start with such a "grain of truth", but with arbitrarily low probability they revise beliefs that are performing badly.� We show that this process converges in probability to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 602.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Repeated games; Nash equilibrium; Rational learning; Bayesian learning; Absolute continuity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-05-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-05-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-02 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John H. Nachbar, 1997.
"Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
- John H. Nachbar, 1995. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 9504001, EconWPA, revised 14 Feb 1996.
- John Nachbar, 2010. "Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 576, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1998. "-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-244.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.